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ABSTRACT
This study examined the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and the level of corporate risk disclosure amongst Malaysian listed 
companies pre- and post-Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012. 
Content analysis was employed. A total of 122 firm-year observations was 
examined in order to measure the extent of risk disclosure against audit 
committee effectiveness. The findings reveal only audit committee size 
and diligence are significant in explaining the variations in corporate 
risk disclosure for pre- and post-MCCG 2012. This indicates that audit 
committee size does matter in assisting the revelation of corporate risk 
disclosure. It also signifies that audit committees are responsible and 
discharge their duties accordingly with reference to the higher number 
of audit committee meetings. An unexpected result was also found in this 
study where an inverse relationship was detected between audit committee 
independence and corporate risk disclosure. The result is contrary to 
the requirement of MCCG 2012 that emphasizes the importance of an 
independent director under its Principle 3.5. Further, the result also shows 
that the audit committee effectiveness have increasing in the post-MCCG 
2012 period compared to pre-MCCG 2012 in determining the extent of risk 
disclosure of the sampled firms.
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INTROduCTION
Corporate governance issues have grabbed the world’s attention with high 
profile corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom in 2001 and 2002 
respectively. Malaysia was also contaminated with the same problems 
and loopholes in corporate governance that surfaced when a number of 
corporate failures were recorded after the financial crisis in 1997/1998. 
This can be traced to the irregularities in financial reporting of Malaysian 
giant companies such as Transmiles, Malaysian Airline Systems and Port 
Klang Free Zone (Norwani et al., 2011; & Zainudian & Hashim, 2016).This 
situation  led to a great public unease as stakeholders’ lost their confidence 
on the financial statements of companies (Probohudono, Tower&Rusmin, 
2013).
Several surveys had proved that Malaysia had issues with fraud, 
kickbacks and corruption. In 2014, Malaysia was ranked 50 by the 
Transparency International Secretariat Corruption Index with a score of 52. 
The problem was also growing at the organizational level in Malaysia as 
highlighted by KPMG Management & Risk Consulting Sdn Bhd (2014). 
Despite the efforts done by the government, the problems are still dominant 
in Malaysia. Industries that consistently score the top three highest rank in 
the KPMG survey are manufacturing (2013:26%, 2009:15%), consumer 
products (2013:18%, 2009:13%) and construction (2013:18%, 2009:14%). 
Due to the sudden demise of several companies mentioned above, 
sufficient risk disclosure is highly needed for Malaysian companies. 
However, previous studies suggest that higher risk companies will disclose 
less information to the public as they believe that a higher level of risk 
disclosure will highlight their actual risk level (Anderson & Agarwal, 2011). 
According to Probohudono et al. (2013) a higher risk disclosure is found in 
firms with sound corporate governance systems. Therefore, this study will 
look into the effectiveness of corporate governance to monitor the extent 
of corporate risk disclosure by focusing on roles of the audit committee 
in financial reporting. Effectiveness of audit committees however depends 
on the active and collaborative participation from all parties including the 
board of directors, the management and the audit committee itself. It is 
important to understand which audit committee characteristics influence the 
risk management disclosure in Malaysian companies. Audit committee was 
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chosen because one of its duties is to assist in strengthening the operations 
and firm sustainability. Due to this reason, it is important to have a sound 
audit committee in an organization as they ensure the quality and credibility 
of financial reporting (Nelson &Devi, 2013). 
The Government of Malaysia has also taken part in strengthening 
corporate governance by establishing the Malaysian Code and Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) in 2000 which was subsequently revised in 2007. 
The MCCG 2007 was then revised and substituted with MCCG 2012 which 
had few improvements and become effective starting from March 2012.
Considering all the problems and the initiatives that have been taken by the 
Government of Malaysia, the study intended to determine whether MCCG 
2012 had influenced the effectiveness of audit committees in monitoring 
the level of risk disclose by Malaysian public listed companies. 
Therefore, the objectives of this study is twofold, 1) to provide a 
greater understanding on audit committee characteristics that may influence 
the compliance level of risk disclosure as stipulated by the Principle 
6 (Recognise and manage risks) of the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012), and; 2) to determine whether the revised 
MCCG 2012 increased the effectiveness of audit committees to monitor 
corporate risk disclosure. The results of this study will be very useful in 
understanding the factors that influence the revelation of risk information 
and the extent of risk disclosure in current reporting in Malaysian public 
listed companies.
LITERaTuRE REvIEw
The hypothetical relationship between audit committee and risk disclosure 
can be explained by the Agency Theory. Agency costs have been defined 
as costs arising from the likelihood that managers place personal interests 
ahead of shareholders’ interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Information 
asymmetry exists when management has more relevant information about 
the firm compared to shareholders subsequent to limitations caused by the 
intense competition in the market and the separation of ownership and 
control in firms. Due to information asymmetry, the principal is unable to 
determine whether the agent is performing the task for which he or she is 
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paid (adverse selection) or in doubt as to whether  agents have  done their 
work according to their ability (moral hazard) (Ashraf, Bandiera & Jack, 
2014). Therefore, financial reporting and disclosure are crucially important 
for management to highlight firm performance and governance to the 
public (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016). High risk disclosure will lead firms to low 
information asymmetry and thus increase firm’s credibility.
Previously, risk management was used to assist organizations from 
loss through avoiding downside risks. However, in today’s world risk 
management has become an important aspect of firm’s internal control, 
corporate governance and acts as a basic element in the business world 
(Domínguez & Gámez, 2014). Besides, risk management is also used in 
taking the upside (opportunities) while managing the downside (threat) 
risks. Risk management becomes an essential element in maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth as it focusses on profit maximization while reducing 
the probability of financial failure (Stulz, 2015). In addition, the researcher 
found that institutional investors require individual and detailed risk 
reporting compared to general information of business risks as they find such 
reporting insufficient in helping their portfolio investment decision-making.
A study conducted by Linsley & Shrives (2005) showed the directors 
are seemed to be willing to discuss external risks where greater emphasize 
is stressed on good risks. They also prefer to focus more on past risks 
compared to future risks. The reasons for these types of disclosures are due 
to the nature of internal risks which cause the firm to incur higher proprietary 
costs of disclosure. Proprietary costs also cause mimicking behaviour to 
take place in the annual report disclosures as the directors are reluctant 
to voluntarily disclose information that other companies are unwilling to 
disclose (Anderson & Agarwal, 2011). The same problem on risk revelation 
occurred in South Africa where firms were largely focused on information 
which are non-financial (ie: operational, business and strategic), historical, 
good news and qualitative in nature (Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013).  
A number of research have also been conducted on Malaysian public 
listed companies (Amran, Abdul Manaf & Che Haat, 2008; Atan, Sutan 
Maruhun, Wan Abdul Kadir & Jusoff, 2010; Ismail, Arshad, & Othman, 
2014) in which most reported risks in the annual report are related to 
industry, competitors, plans and performance. It is due to the Bursa Malaysia 
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requirements for companies to disclose industry trends, development, group 
performance and material factors underlying results and financial position 
(Ali & Taylor, 2014). Another study showed that Malaysian companies are 
less transparent in risk disclosure whereby only 44.24% of risk information 
were released to the public in the annual report (Atan et. al., 2010). This 
is supported by results found in the research conducted by Ismail et. al., 
(2014) where they found the quality of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian 
companies is still at the average level in 2008 and 2009. This might be due to 
the lack of exposure to the importance of those information to shareholders 
and stakeholders in their investment decision making. 
The audit committee has been widely accepted as a device that could 
assist in ensuring good quality corporate governance practices, mediating the 
disagreements between management and external auditors, synchronizing 
internal and external audit tasks as well as ensuring the quality of the firm’s 
financial reporting (Adelopo, Jallow, & Scott, 2012; Lin, Xiao & Tang, 
2008).It is also suggested that audit committee induces in balancing the 
power between accountability and audit relationships. Nevertheless, Cai, 
Hillier, Tian, & Wu (2015) contend that the existence of audit committee 
will only be worthwhile when benefits from their presence outweigh the 
expenses of not having them.
hypotheses development
Audit Committee Size
The audit committee is a subset of the main board. Therefore, from an 
agency theory perspective, the main board plays a vital role in determining 
audit committee structure in terms of size and composition. A bigger audit 
committee is also linked to a higher quality of financial reporting as they are 
able to enforce a better oversight function and improve the earning quality 
by lowering the chances of financial statements restatement (Adelopo et. 
al., 2012; Lin, Li, & Yang 2006). MCCG 2012 and Paragraph 15.10(1)(a) 
of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad requires 
a listed firm to appoint an audit committee from amongst its directors and 
the composition of the audit committee must be not less than 3 members. 
Based on Adelopo et. al., (2012) and Lin, Li, & Yang (2006), the following 
hypothesis was developed:
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H1: Audit committee size will significantly positively influence the level 
of corporate risk disclosure in the annual report of Malaysian public 
listed companies 
Audit Committee Independence
Agency problems arise due to the conflicting interests between a 
manager and the shareholder (Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to the 
Agency Theory, higher accountability, independence and responsibility is 
associated to independent non-executive directors (INED) whereby they are 
more likely to be accountable to stakeholder concerns regarding revelation 
of risks. In addition, INED have the ability to put pressure on managers 
in disclosing high level risk disclosures (Domínguez & Gámez, 2014). 
Therefore, the composition of the board of directors play an important 
role in reducing agency problems and assist in increasing the effectiveness 
of a firm’s corporate governance (Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, & Yao, 
2009). The audit committee is regarded as independent when they do not 
have any personal or financial affiliation with the firm (Rainsbury, Bradbury 
& Cahan, 2009). Based on these arguments from the previous literature, it 
is hypothesized that:
H2: Audit committee independence will have a significant positive 
influence on the disclosure of corporate risks in the annual report of 
Malaysian public listed companies
Audit Committee Financial Expertise
Previous research suggests that the existence of financial experts on 
audit committees positively influence audit committee effectiveness in 
monitoring financial reporting quality. The higher proportion of accounting 
financial expertise on an audit committee is positively associated with 
financial reporting timeliness (Abernathy et. al, 2014), internal control 
effectiveness (Chen, Cao & Xia, 2014) and high quality accounting 
information disclosure. It is also suggested that directors with financial 
expertise are able to improve the quality of accounting information  as they 
are well-versed and understand the complexity of financial information 
(Ran et. al., 2014).
Paragraph 15.10(1)(c) of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad requires that at least one member of the audit committee 
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of public listed companies who is literate in financial matters  sits in the 
audit committee. This indicate financial literacy is a vital element in audit 
committee characteristic as only members with financial literacy are able to 
comply with this principle. Therefore, the following hypothesis is posited:
H3a: Audit committee financial expertise with professional certifications 
(e.g. MIA, MICPA, ACCA, CIMA, etc.) will significantly positively 
influence the extent of risk disclosure in the annual report of Malaysian 
public listed companies
H3b: An audit committee chairman with financial expertise will significantly 
positively influence the extent of risk disclosure in the annual report 
of Malaysian public listed companies.
Audit Committee Financial Accounting Expert with Professional 
Certification (ACFINEX1) is measured by the proportion of audit 
committee members with professional certification in accounting to the total 
number of audit committee members (Yasin & Nelson, 2012; Lary & Taylor, 
2012; Mohd Shatari, 2012). Audit committee is considered as financial 
accounting experts with professional certification if they are members of 
the Malaysian Institute of Accountants under Part II of the First Schedule 
of the Accountants Act, 1967. 
Audit Committee Chairman with Financial Expertise (ACFINEX2) 
takes place when the chairman of an audit committee is an expert in financial 
accounting. The variable is awarded with a value of 1 if the audit committee 
chairman is a financial accounting expert and 0 for those who do not comply 
with the requirement which is consistent with the suggestion in Mohd 
Shatari (2012).
Audit Committee Diligence
Audit committee diligence is proxy by the audit committee’s meeting 
frequency held in a particular financial year. Diligence is defined as the 
willingness of committee members to cooperate as expected to prepare, 
make inquiries, and seek  answers when dealing with internal parties (i.e. 
management, internal auditors) and external parties (i.e. external auditors 
and other related constituents) (DeZoort et. al., 2002). 
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The MCCG 2012 does not specify the number of audit committee 
meetings to be held in a year. However, the Listing Requirements of 
Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad requires a minimum of audit committee 
meetings to be held during a financial year, or more frequently as and when 
required. Higher number of meetings held by audit committee indicates that 
the audit committee is active in improving and monitoring to safeguard 
stakeholders’ best interests (DeZoort et al., 2002). It also shows that audit 
committees are committed in discharging their duties and responsibilities. 
On the other hand, Kamarudian, Ismail & Alwi (2014) suggests that firms 
with less audit committee meetings were involved in fraudulent activities. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis was tested:
H4: Audit committee diligence will have a significant positive influence 
on the disclosure of corporate risks in the annual report of Malaysian 
public listed companies
Control variables
Firm Size
Previous studies have proven that there is an association between 
firm size and risk disclosure (Linsley& Shrives, 2005; Elshandidy et al., 
2013). The Agency Theory predicts that agency costs arise due to firm size 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and this can be controlled through the use of the 
financial reporting disclosure that helps in reducing information asymmetry 
(Shehata, 2014). As a firm  becomes bigger, the number of stakeholders that 
are interested in the firm’s affairs increase. Thus, risk disclosure becomes 
crucial in order to fulfill the needs of a prominent group of people (Amran 
et al., 2008) and to maintain corporate reputation (Oliveira, Lima Rodrigues, 
& Craig, 2011). Probohudono et al., (2013) suggests that bigger firms reveal 
more risk information as they have greater financial resources to absorb the 
cost of diclosure voluntarily compared to smaller firms. Based on the above 
arguments, it is expected that larger firms disclose more risk disclosures 
compared to the smaller firms.
Leverage
Oliveira et al. (2011) found that leverage has a significant influence 
on the level of risk disclosure. This is due to highly leveraged firms being 
associated with a higher level of agency costs and riskier as chances 
of shifting of possession from debtholders to stockholders may occur 
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(Domínguez & Gámez, 2014). Therefore, this type of firms are highly 
monitored by a greater power of debtholders. Thus, it is expected that firms 
with this characteristic have strong incentives to disclose a higher level of 
risk disclosure in order to justify and explain the condition of the firm to 
the debtholders (Amran et al., 2008). Based on the above arguments, it is 
expected that firms which are highly leveraged will disclose higher levels 
of risk disclosure  compared to the smaller firms. Leverage is expected to be 
positively correlated with disclosure of risks. This is due to highly leveraged 
firms being closely monitored by a greater power of debtholders (Oliveira 
et al., 2011). Therefore, strong incentives to disclose higher levels of risk 
disclosure exist in order to justify and explain the condition of the firm to 
debtholders (Amran et al., 2008).
Profitability
According to the Agency Theory, managers of highly profitable firm 
tend to disclose more information to the public in order to prove their 
performance and obtain job security with higher levels of compensation. 
In addition, information disclosure is also used by managers as a signal 
to the market on the quality of their investment (Domínguez & Gámez, 
2014). Besides, it also help managers to show their ability to identify and 
manage risks (Elshandidy et al., 2013). Therefore, it is expected that a highly 
profitable firm will disclose a higher level of risk disclosure as compared 
to the smaller firms. It is argued that managers of profitable firms release 
a higher level of risk disclosure to the market as a signal on the quality of 
their investment (Domínguez & Gámez, 2014). Besides, the disclosure is 
also used to show their ability to identify and manage risks (Elshandidy 
et al., 2013).
The Measurement of Risk disclosure Index
For the dependent variable, risk disclosure index was calculated using 
content analysis. In the early stage of the research, an extensive review of the 
literature was undertaken to investigate the commonness across the subject 
area and to recognize items that are associated with risk disclosure. A Risk 
Disclosure Index was constructed based on the number of risk disclosure. 
Each risk disclosure reported was recorded and classified into 14 categories 
of voluntary risk disclosure (see Appendix 1) which were derived from 
the recommendation of previous studies (Anderson & Agarwal, 2011; 
Miihkinen, 2012 and Ntim et al., 2013). A score of “1” was given for each 
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of risk disclosure and a score of “0” was given for non-disclosure of risk 
management. Fourteen items were evaluated on the disclosure checklist, 
resulting in a maximum of 14 points (i.e. 100% disclosure) and a minimum 
of 0 point (0% disclosure). A disclosure index was calculated by dividing 
the total number of risk disclosure obtained by a company in the sample to 
the maximum score of risk disclosure.
The research framework for this study suggests that audit committee 
characteristics such as size, independence, financial accounting expertise 
and diligence have a certain influence on the extent of firm’s risk disclosure. 
Based on this premise the following model was developed in order to test 
the hypotheses:
CRD
i,t 
= α0 + β1ACSIZEi,t + β2ACINDi,t + β3ACFINEX1i,t + 
β4ACFINEX2i,t + β5 ACDILi,t + β6SIZEi,t + β7LEVi,t + β8PROFi,t + ε
Where:
CRdi,t The extent of risk disclosure for firm i at time t. 
ACSIZEi,t Audit committee size measured by the number of board members on the audit 
committee at the end of financial year, for firm i at time t. 
ACINDi,t Audit committee independence measured by the proportion (i.e. percentage) 
of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee to the total 
number of directors on the audit committee at the end of the financial year, 
for firm i at time t. 
ACFINEX1i,t Audit committee financial expertise measured by proportion of audit committee 
members with professional certification (i.e. as stipulated under Part II of 
the First Schedule of Accountants Act, 1967) to the total number of audit 
committee members, for firm i at time t.
ACFINEX2i,t Audit committee chairman with accounting financial expertise measured by a 
dummy variable given the value of “1” if the audit committee chairman is an 
accounting financial expert and “0” if otherwise, for firm i at time t.
ACDILi,t Audit committee diligence measured by the frequency of audit committee 
meetings held during a financial year, for firm i at time t.
SIZEi,t Firm size measured by the function of natural logarithm of total assets for a 
particular financial year, for firm i at time t.
LEVi,t Leverage measured by the total liabilities to total assets, for firm i at time t.
PROFi,t Profitability measured by return on assets (i.e. operating income to total 
assets) for firm i at time t.
Α Intercept
β1….β8 The coefficients of audit committee variables
ε The error term 
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SaMPLINg aNd daTa COLLECTION
The annual report of Malaysian listed companies on Bursa Malaysia was 
used as the unit of analysis for this study. Previous studies  suggests that 
company size and industry affects the level of risk disclosure (Elzahar & 
Hussainey, 2012; Zadeh & Eskandari, 2012). Thus, the sample was selected 
from the largest 10 companies from each of the selected industry based on 
market capitalization in order to control for size and industry (Ntim et al., 
2013). The selection of the industry was made based on KPMG survey 
conducted in  2013 on fraud, bribery and corruption (KPMG Management 
& Risk Consulting Sdn Bhd, 2014). The findings of the survey suggest 
that the highest fraudulent activities were scored by firms from trading, 
consumer products, construction, properties, infrastructure and industrial 
products. This study excluded the finance sector from the population as 
they are regulated under different statutory requirements (Suffian & Sanusi, 
2015). Only five companies were selected from infrastructure sector as there 
are limited companies listed on the Main Board under this category. Four 
companies were eliminated due to insufficient data. Therefore, the final 
sample were made up of 61 companies over two firm-years, resulting in a 
total of 122 firm-year observations from six industries. The study intended 
to focus on data from two financial year (FY); years 2011 and 2013 as 
effective date of the MCCG 2012 in Malaysia was on 31 December 2012. 
Therefore, it will help in identifying the level of risk disclosure prior to the 
implementation of MCCG 2012 (FY 2011) and after the implementation 
of MCCG 2012 (FY 2013). 
Table 1: The Sample firms according to Bursa Malaysia Listing Sectors
Sector Number of firms Number of firm-year Percentage
Trading and Services 10 20 16.40
Consumer Products 9 18 14.75
Construction 9 18 14.75
Property 9 18 14.75
Infrastructure 5 10 8.20
Industrial Products 10 20 16.40
Plantation 9 18 14.75
Total 61 122 100.00
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fINdINgS
descriptive analysis for dependent variables
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the extent of risk 
disclosure for the years 2011 and 2013. 
Table 2: descriptive Statistics for the Risk 
disclosure Index for the year 2011 and 2013
year Mean Median Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
2011 0.636 0.643 0.200 -0.408 0.017 0.143 1.000
2013 0.761 0.769 0.161 -0.136 -0.982 0.385 1.000
The extent of risk disclosures for 61 listed companies in the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia for 2011 ranged from 14.3 percent to 100 percent 
with a mean score of 63.6 percent and a standard deviation of 20 percent. 
The extent of risk disclosure in 2013 proved that there is an improvement in 
risk disclosure with a mean score of 76.1 percent and a standard deviation of 
16.1 percent. As indicated in Table 3, the mean score for risk disclosure prior 
to the implementation of MCCG 2012 among firms was 63.6 percent. These 
results indicated that the disclosure level amongst top listed companies was 
still at low level and this is consistent with prior studies in Malaysia (Amran 
et. al., 2008; Ismail & Rahman, 2013). However, a slight improvement was 
found in the revelation of risk in 2013 by 12.5 percent compared to 2011 
(2013:76.1%; 2011:63.6%). This indicates that firms have taken appropriate 
action to comply with the Principle 6 of MCCG 2012 – Recognize and 
Manage Risks whereby the board of directors is required to establish a 
sound risk management framework in managing risks. Further analysis 
discovered that results from individual types of risks were also consistent 
with the overall findings on risk disclosure as indicated in Table 3. A slight 
increase was found in operational risks (10.2%) and strategic risks (6.6%). 
The highest increase was recorded for risk management disclosure with 
19 percent. 
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Table 3 descriptive Statistics for the Types 
of Risk for the year 2011 and 2013
variables year Mean Med. Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
Operational Risk
2011 0.741 0.800 0.277 -1.010 0.579 0.000 1.000
2013 0.843 0.800 0.183 -1.253 1.645 0.200 1.000
Strategic Risk
2011 0.716 0.750 0.249 -0.824 0.698 0.000 1.000
2013 0.782 0.750 0.236 -0.938 0.668 0.000 1.000
Risk Management
2011 0.469 0.400 0.301 0.113 -0.944 0.000 1.000
2013 0.659 0.600 0.277 -0.242 -1.183 0.200 1.000
 
A number of companies have made an effort to make a transparent 
disclosure on risk management whereby the risk management policies, 
existence of a risk management committee and the availability of meetings 
conducted in a year were disclosed in a separate report under the “Statement 
on Risks and Internal Control” title. 
descriptive analysis for Independent variables
The descriptive analysis for audit committee effectiveness is 
presented in Table 4. The result indicates that companies do comply with 
the requirement of Paragraph 15.10(1)(a) of the Listing Requirements of 
Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad which requires a listed firm to have an 
audit committee which must be comprised of a minimum of 3 members. 
The majority of the audit committee members in the sample data comprised 
of independent directors with the average audit committee independence 
(ACIND) of 88.7 percent for  2011 and 83.9 percent for  2013. This is in 
compliance with Paragraph 15.10(1)(b) of the Listing Requirements of 
Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad which requires public listed companies 
to appoint a majority of its audit committee members from its independent 
directors. However, this result proved that non-compliance does exist 
(2011:11.3%; 2013:16.1%) as not all listed companies in the sample data 
complied with this requirement. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the Audit Committee Effectiveness 
and Control variables for the year 2011 and 2013 
variables year Mean Med. Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
ACSIZE
2011 3.520 3.000 0.721 1.565 2.857 3.000 6.000
2013 3.620 3.000 0.820 1.185 0.697 3.000 6.000
ACIND
2011 0.887 1.000 0.153 -1.100 0.934 0.330 1.000
2013 0.839 1.000 0.183 -0.765 -0.138 0.330 1.000
ACFINEX1
2011 0.364 0.333 0.150 0.914 0.746 0.000 0.750
2013 0.389 0.333 0.171 0.108 1.937 0.000 1.000
ACFINEX2
2011 0.443 - - - - 0.000 1.000
2013 0.541 - - - - 0.000 1.000
ACDIL
2011 5.150 5.000 2.032 2.086 9.325 0.000 15.00
2013 5.520 5.000 1.858 2.167 6.474 4.000 14.00
SIZE
2011 9.161 9.322 0.844 0.762 0.123 7.218 10.684
2013 9.209 9.374 0.893 -0.867 0.176 7.007 10.729
2011 0.404 0.376 0.227 0.351 -0.391 0.000 0.999
LEV 2013 0.414 0.392 0.199 0.269 -0.770 0.056 0.824
2011 0.104 0.090 0.097 1.551 3.897 -0.100 0.460
PROF 2013 0.093 0.063 0.096 3.038 12.724 -0.060 0.600
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: audit committee size (ACSIZE); audit committee 
independence (ACIND); audit committee with accounting financial expertise (ACFINEX1); 
chairman of audit committee with financial expertise (ACFINEX2); Audit committee diligence 
(ACDIL); firm size (SIZE); leverage (LEV); profitability (PROF)
Audit committee with financial expertise (ACFINEX1) scored a mean 
of 36.4 percent and 38.9 percent for 2011 and 2013 respectively which 
suggests a high number of non-compliance to Paragraph 15.10(1)(c) of the 
Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad. More than half 
of the sample did  not have at least one member of the audit committee who 
is financially literate. The result for audit committee meeting found in 2013 
is consistent with the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad which requires the audit committee to hold at least four meetings 
during a financial year, or more frequently as and when required.
Correlation analysis
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the dependent variables 
and independent variables employed in this study. The VIF result for all 
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variables ranged from 1.0 to 1.2 which indicates that no multicollinearity 
issues existed in this study as only VIF values of above 10 will violate the 
multicollinearity assumption (Pallant, 2013).
Table 5: Pearson Correlation of the Independent variables 
and Risk disclosure Index for year 2011 and 2013
Correlation CRd aCSIZE aCINd ACFINEX1 ACFINEX2 aCdIL PROf LEv SIZE
CRD 1.000 0.226* -0.131 0.050 0.086 0.317** -0.015 -0.003 0.045
ACSIZE 0.226* 1.000 -0.265** -0.203* 0.098 0.124 -0.054 0.024 -0.128
ACIND -0.131 -0.265** 1.000 0.012 0.017 0.156 -0.129 -0.001 0.064
ACFINEX1 0.050 -0.203* 0.012 1.000 0.216* -0.039 0.193 0.036 -0.015
ACFINEX2 0.086 0.098 0.017 0.216* 1.000 0.049 0.052 0.031 -0.171
ACDIL 0.317** 0.124 0.156 -0.039 0.049 1.000 -0.159 -0.076 -0.256**
PROF -0.015 -0.054 -0.129 0.193* 0.052 -0.159 1.000 -0.161 -0.048
LEV -0.003 0.024 -0.001 0.036 0.031 -0.076 -0.161 1.000 0.222*
SIZE 0.045 -0.128 0.064 -0.015 -0.171 -0.256** -0.048 0.222* 1.000
Notes: p-values in parantheses. Variables were defined as follows: audit committee size (ACSIZE); audit 
committee independence (ACIND); audit committee with accounting financial expertise (ACFINEX1); 
chairman of audit committee with financial expertise (ACFINEX2); audit committee diligence (ACDIL); 
profitability (PROF); leverage (LEV); firm size (SIZE).
*** Significant at the1% level
**  Significant at the 5% level
*        Significant at the 10% level
Regression analysis
Table 6 presents the Multiple Linear Regression Analysis which 
shows the relationship of audit committee effectiveness and the control 
variables on corporate risk disclosure for the research population (N=122).
The regression results showed that the adjusted R Square (R2) for the 
regression model to be 0.196. This implies that 19.6 percent of the total 
variation in corporate risk disclosure can be explained by the full model. 
However, a comparison between two sample periods showed that there 
was an increase in R2 between year 2011 and 2013 with 21.3 percent and 
26.3 percent respectively. This indicates that the ability of the independent 
variables to explain the changes in risk disclosure is greater in post-MCCG 
2012 compared to pre-MCCG 2012. 
Overall, audit committee size (ACSIZE) was significantly and 
positively correlated to corporate risk disclosure (CRD) at the 5 percent level. 
However, a higher percentage of average ACSIZE was recorded in 2011 
compared to 2013. This indicates that an audit committee is one important 
factor that assists in increasing risk disclosure levels among Malaysian 
listed companies. Contrary to expectation of MCCG 2012, overall audit 
282
MANAGEMENT & AccouNTiNG rEviEw, voluME 19 No. 1, APril 2020
committee independence (ACIND) was found to be negatively correlated 
to corporate risk disclosure with a non-significant relationship. This implies 
audit committee independence does not influence  risk disclosure.
Table 6: Regression Analysis for Effects of Audit Committee 
Effectiveness and the Control Variables on Corporate 
Risk disclosure for the year 2011 and 2013
year (1)all
(2)
2011
(3)
2013
Intercept 0.063 -0.426 0.686
ACSIZE 0.177* 0.256* 0.045
ACIND -0.154* -0.043 -0.290**
ACFINEX1 0.087 0.078 0.101
ACFINEX2 0.067 -0.030 0.193
ACDIL 0.369*** 0.355** 0.432**
PROF 0.019 0.106 -0.112
LEV -0.024 0.025 -0.089
SIZE 0.191** 0.286* 0.016
R2 0.196 0.210 0.257
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.089 0.143
F-statistics 3.445** 1.732 2.252**
N 122 61 61
Notes: p-values in parantheses. Variables were defined as follows: audit committee size 
(ACSIZE); audit committee independence (ACIND); audit committee with accounting financial 
expertise (ACFINEX1); chairman of audit committee with financial expertise (ACFINEX2); 
audit committee diligence (ACDIL); profitability (PROF); leverage (LEV); firm size (SIZE).
*** Significant at the1% level
 **  Significant at the 5% level
*  Significant at the 10% level
Audit committee with accounting financial expertise (ACFINEX1) 
and chairman of audit committee with financial expertise (ACFINEX2) 
was insignificantly positively associated with risk disclosure. The results 
indicate that risk disclosure is insignificantly influenced by audit committee 
financial expertise.Audit committee diligence (ACDIL) which is proxy by 
the number of meetings held during a financial year had a significant positive 
correlation at the1 percent level. Thus, the result implies that corporate risk 
disclosure is highly associated with audit committee diligence. Analysis 
on the control variables selected for this study (i.e. profitability (PROF), 
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showed that firm size (SIZE) is significantly and positively correlated to 
corporate risk disclosure (CRD) at the 5 percent level. However, leverage 
(LEV) and profitability (PROF) do not have a significant influence on 
corporate risk disclosure. 
dISCuSSION
MCCG 2012 and Paragraph 15.10(1)(a) of the Listing Requirements of 
Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad requires a listed firm to appoint an audit 
committee from amongst its directors with a minimum composition of three 
members. A larger board gives advantages to the firm as it offers variety 
for the selection of audit committee members. In addition, a larger board 
is associated with higher quality  financial reporting as it is able to enforce 
a better oversight function and improve the earning quality by lowering 
the chances of financial statements restatement (Adelopo et. al., 2012; Lin 
et. al., 2006). On the other hand, a smaller board offers a limited option in 
selecting audit committee members and thus leads to limited skills which 
may impair the decision making process (Adelopo et al., 2012). However, 
the result of this study is consistent with the results from Yatim (2009) 
and Madi et. al., (2014). The findings suggest that audit committee size is 
positive and significantly correlated with financial reporting quality and 
internal control effectiveness. The result implies that audit committee size 
does matter in assisting the revelation of the corporate risk disclosure but 
it is not affected by the implementation of MCCG 2012. 
Principle 3.5 of the MCCG 2012 and Paragraph 15.10(1)(b) of the 
Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad requires a 
majority of independent directors if the chairman of the board is not an 
independent director. This implies that  the proportion of independent 
directors in board of directors is crucial in ensuring a balance of power and 
authority. In addition, an audit committee should also possess independence 
of view, judgment and action to ensure that their existence is really effective. 
An inverse relationship between audit committee independence and 
corporate risk disclosure was found in this study. The result is consistent 
with previous studies that analyzed the association of audit committee 
independence with financial reporting quality in Malaysia (Abdullah et. 
al., 2010; Hamid et. al., 2015). 
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Paragraph 15.10(1)(c) of the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia 
Securities Berhad requires that at least one member of the audit committee 
is a financial literate and any deviation to this requirement must be justified 
with reasons. The implicit assumption of having this requirement in the 
audit committee is to enhance the audit committee’s oversight function 
on financial reporting. This is because an audit committee with financial 
expertise has the ability to ask the ‘right questions’ and identify any 
potential red flags in the company (Felo & Solieri, 2009) The results show 
that both anaudit committee with financial expertise and chairman of audit 
committee with financial expertise are insignificantly positively associated 
with risk disclosure. However the results suggest that no guarantee can 
be provided that an audit committee with financial expertise will lead to a 
higher voluntary disclosure. 
The MCCG 2012 does not specify  the number of audit committee 
meetings to be held in a year. However, the Listing Requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia Securities Berhad requires the audit committee to hold at least four 
meetings during a financial year, or more frequently as and when required. 
A higher positive and significant association between audit committee 
diligence and the level of risk disclosure was found in 2013 compared to 
2011. On average, the number of audit committee meetings conducted in 
2011 and 2013 was five and six times respectively. Thus, the result implies 
that corporate risk disclosure is highly associated with audit committee 
diligence and MCCG 2012. This indicates that audit committee diligence 
has improved risk disclosure levels in the Malaysian listed companies with 
a higher number of meetings recorded after the implementation of MCCG 
2012. The positive and significant result found indicates that the frequency 
of meetings is a crucial component for audit committee effectiveness 
in Malaysian listed companies as it signifies that the audit committees 
are responsible in discharging their duties. In addition, audit committee 
diligence will also enhance the level of oversight including those related 
to business operations, risk management and control activities.  
CONCLuSIONS
The objective of this study was to identify audit committee effectiveness in 
monitoring the level of risk disclosure in Malaysian public listed companies 
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during pre and post implementation of the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012).This study provided evidence that audit 
committee size and audit committee diligence do  influence the extent of 
corporate risk disclosure. However, an unexpected result was detected 
on audit committee diligence whereby an inverse relationship was found 
between audit committee characteristics and corporate risk disclosure. On 
the other hand, no relationship was found between audit committee with 
financial expertise as well as audit committee chairman with financial 
expertise against risk disclosure. The results also provide evidence  that the 
Revised MCCG 2012 did  bring some positive impact on audit committee 
effectiveness as shown by an increase of R2 for the post-MCCG 2012 sample 
firms. The results also suggest that it is important for Bursa Malaysia to 
enforce stringent rules for independent audit committee members and also 
audit committees with financial expertise in order to ensure that they are 
well equipped with knowledge and expertise as required to discharge their 
roles and responsibilities effectively. Therefore, mandatory accreditation 
programme, continuing education programmes and other suitable training 
should be made compulsory for audit committee members in order to 
enhance their competency in financial reporting.
The results should be interpreted with caution since this study suffers 
with several limitations. First of all, this study only employed non-financial 
firms in Malaysia and was limited to the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. 
Therefore, generalization of the findings to all firms listed on the other 
boards of Bursa Malaysia is not possible due to the non-existence of other 
board samples. In addition, the sample data of this study only covered 
the years 2011 and 2013 which is pre- and post MCCG 2012 and thus the 
results may not be extended to other periods as the results may be different 
across different time periods. Finally, this study only investigated audit 
committee effectiveness and voluntary corporate risk disclosure. Therefore, 
future studies should consider a longer time series to capture the effects of 
the new MCCG 2012. This is important as new policies and procedures 
will take a longer period to be implemented and to reflect improvements.  
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APPENDIX 1
Voluntary Risk Disclosures
1. Interest rate
2. Exchange rate
3. Commodity
4. Liquidity
5. Credit
6. Customer satisfaction
7. Product
8. Development
9. Efficiency and performance
10. Sourcing
11. Stock obsolescence and shrinkage
12. Product and service failure
13. Environmental, health and safety
14. Brand name erosion

